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Globalisation and the loosening of credit conditions have led to an increase in income and wealth 
inequalities in the developed economies. The 2008–2009 crisis has forced a deleveraging process, 
leading to a prolonged recovery due to further demand cuts. The protracted economic problems and 
the inadequate management of economic policy in the EU increased social discontent that may have 
eventually contributed to Brexit. The short- and long-run impacts of the decision are diffi cult to 
judge, given that the details of the exit process cannot yet be known. Currently, there is a consensus 
among analysts that the negative economic effects could be greater in the UK in the short term. 
However, in the longer term, the UK may benefi t from a potentially more fl exible economic policy 
framework, while socio-political and economic risks are imposed on the European economy by the 
secondary effects due to its structural problems and the uncertain future of its institutional system.
 As a small open economy, Hungary highly depends on the economic performance of its foreign 
trade partners. We have found that the economic impact of Brexit on Hungary remains moder-
ate. Among the direct channels, the foreign trade channel may be the dominant. Meanwhile, the 
reduction of EU funds and remittances will affect the Hungarian growth only modestly. Hungary’s 
vulnerability has improved substantially since the 2008–2009 crisis. Accordingly, potential second-
round effects of Brexit may remain subdued and be mitigated through substantial room for manoeu-
vre for economic policies.
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1. INTRODUCTION
On June 23, 2016, when the majority of British voters decided to exit from the 
European Union, it became clear that the EU cannot and will not be what it used 
to be. The mapping of the underlying reasons and expected consequences of the 
decision, which was a surprise for many analysts, began immediately. More than 
three months elapsed, but still little is known about the details of the consequenc-
es. Presumably, negotiations are already being conducted behind the scenes, but 
the general public still does not know about the timing and the form of Britain’s 
leaving the EU. 
Regarding the reasons, however, a number of deeper analyses have been pre-
pared. Some of them – especially in the beginning – considered the outcome as a 
hasty political decision and exaggerated emotional reaction of British society. In 
our opinion, this explanation captures the background of the events superficially 
and wrongly. Moreover, without exploring the background of the deeper reasons, 
this explanation may also be an obstacle to the necessary renewal of the economy 
and institutional system of Europe.
In economies, everything is interrelated. The economic, social, and political 
developments taking place in individual countries or regions cannot be separated 
from one another. The history of mankind has proven in innumerable instances 
that deepening economic problems sooner or later result in social tensions with 
serious political consequences. This is how it happens in our times as well. 
Our study focuses on two issues. Firstly, we provide an overview of the eco-
nomic reasons that may have contributed to the outcome of the UK referendum, 
and secondly, we examine the channels through which Brexit may affect the Hun-
garian economy.
2. EUROPE IS FALLING BEHIND 
Some of the economic reasons date back several decades and are mainly related 
to the strengthening of globalisation tendencies. An extremely dynamic increase 
in global trade was observed in this period of hyperglobalisation, a term coined 
by Dani Rodrik. Turning into global production chains, large multinational com-
panies relocated an increasing portion of the production of goods and services 
from more developed Western economies to Asian or Eastern European regions, 
where wage costs are lower. These decades coincide with the appearance of Asian 
economies – and within that of China in particular – in the global market and 
their extremely rapid development. In parallel with the increasing role of China, 
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the EU lost its economic weight in a steady and spectacular manner despite the 
enlargements (Table 1).
The relocation of production from more developed Western economies abroad 
resulted in uncertain income and labour market prospects in the sectors and re-
gions concerned, and through that in rising social discontent. In the period pre-
ceding the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, its surfacing was prevented by the 
rapid increase in indebtedness. With easing of credit conditions and increase in 
loan outflows, even lower-income households were able to finance an expanding 
consumption path. The crisis and the ensuing inevitable adjustment put an end to 
this process. 
Table 1. Share of economic regions in the world GDP
 1995 2000 2005 2015
China  2.4  3.6  4.8 14.8
European Union 31.1 26.5 30.4 22.1
United States 25.0 30.9 27.8 24.4
Rest of the World 41.5 39.1 37.0 38.7
World 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: Calculated from data in current prices.
Source: World Bank, WDI database.
Figure 1. Change in real income at various percentiles of global income distribution
Source: Milanovic (2012: 13).
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In the past decades, increase in disparities in income and wealth became a 
phenomenon that was in part closely related to globalisation. According to the 
findings of Branko Milanovic (2012), in global comparison, low growth or stag-
nation of real incomes mainly affected the low and middle classes of developed 
Western societies (Figure 1).
3. EUROPEAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
The two afore-mentioned factors, which had been exerting their influence for 
decades, had a perceptible impact not only in Britain, but also in almost all of the 
more developed Western European countries. This was exacerbated by the con-
sequences of the 2008–2009 global crisis and the subsequent protracted and ex-
tremely slow European recovery, which were particularly serious in some econo-
mies. These economic problems are mainly important in terms of the future of 
the euro area and the European Union, as the repercussions of Brexit are coming 
to the surface when, as a result of insufficient crisis management, increasingly 
larger social groups feel that they are the losers of globalisation and the financial 
crisis. 
Already prior to the deepening of the crisis, the euro area and the European 
Union struggled with numerous problems: indebtedness was relatively high in 
the majority of member countries, competitiveness deteriorated in a number of 
countries, while significant internal imbalances evolved, and several countries 
faced problems with the banking sector as well. 
During crisis management, the euro area put special emphasis on fiscal disci-
pline, expecting it to stimulate economic growth. However, this dogma has been 
proved false by now. There is increasing evidence that in the case of a crisis 
featuring high imbalances, this type of economic policy only results in further 
problems; therefore, new, unconventional solutions are needed (more focus on 
burden sharing, speeding up portfolio cleaning in the banking sector, and targeted 
measures on incentivising credit growth). The global financial crisis that started 
in 2007 is different from the recessions experienced before. It is characterised by 
a much more protracted and deeper economic downturn than the crisis periods 
observed to date. Growth continues to be subdued, and unemployment is still 
considered high nearly one decade after the outbreak of the crisis. The number of 
unemployed in the EU still exceeds 22 million, while the youth unemployment 
rate is between 40–50% in the countries of Southern Europe. These unfavourable 
developments may be attributable basically to two underlying factors: firstly, the 
current crisis may be regarded as a kind of balance sheet crisis, which is charac-
terised by slower recovery as a matter of course, and secondly, inadequate eco-
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nomic policy responses to the crisis in some regions may also have contributed to 
the protraction of the crisis.
It is typical of a balance sheet crisis that following the bursting of the financial 
bubble evolving simultaneously with significant debt accumulation, economic 
agents restrain their spending and mainly focus on increasing their savings and 
repaying their debts. Reducing the outstanding debt can take place only by sav-
ings from incomes, although this is a protracted process (Koo 2008, 2014). As a 
result, balance sheet crises last longer and entail higher real economy costs than 
the usual recessions (Figure 2).
During the protracted balance sheet adjustment process, the efficiency of tra-
ditional monetary policy in stimulating the economy declines as a result of the 
unwillingness of economic agents to borrow, and thus the role of fiscal policy in 
the adequate support of economic growth may increase (Koo 2008).
Another feature of a balance sheet recession is that it can be characterised as 
a kind of stock type imbalance, whose treatment differs from that of flow imbal-
ances. One of the deficiencies of European economic policy reactions to the crisis 
was that this feature of the balance sheet crisis was not taken into account. The 
overheating in the economy in the case of traditional business cycles is treated 
by the restraining of aggregate demand, which can be implemented by fiscal or 
monetary policy tightening (Csortos – Szalai 2015). However, the adequate treat-
ment of a stock imbalance is different from that, as the reduction of the imbalance 
Figure 2. Output of the US economy during the previous recessions and present crisis
Source: Atkinson et al. (2013: 4).
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that built up during a longer period of time is also a protracted process, entailing 
a downturn in demand. In this case, stabilising the income position of economic 
agents and thus accelerating the balance sheet deleveraging process may ensure 
the earliest restoration of the balance and the pick-up in growth.
In Europe, however, in parallel with monetary policy stimulation, economic 
policy responses targeted the reduction of the budget deficit and increasing tight-
ening measures. However, as a result of the significant macroeconomic uncer-
tainty and the weak credit demand due to the deleveraging process, the efficiency 
of traditional monetary policy instruments declines. Moreover, during the current 
balance sheet crisis, when central banks’ nominal interest rates declined close to 
the level considered as the lower bound, the coefficient of the fiscal multiplier is 
also greater (Christiano et al. 2011), and thus the real economy costs of the tight-
ening measures also became higher. For the adequate management of the crisis, 
instead of the tightening measures, fiscal policy should have provided more lee-
way for facilitating the balance sheet adjustment of economic agents. It is only 
worth tightening the fiscal policy if the balance sheet deleveraging process has 
progressed sufficiently, and economic growth is already well founded. 
Initially, both the United States and the EU reacted to the crisis by fiscal eas-
ing. Later, however, fiscal policies varied significantly across countries. Follow-
ing the onset of economic upturn, the US continued to support the fiscal stimulus 
in order not to jeopardise the upturn with too early tightening (Csortos – Szalai 
2015). However, at their meeting in Toronto in 2010, the G20 countries agreed on 
a gradual expenditure cut (G20 2010). Following that, fiscal policies were tight-
ened and the adjustment of budgetary deficits was started both in the euro area 
and the United Kingdom. In the case of the euro area, it was justified by the fiscal 
rules as well as by the solvency problems of some periphery countries (Csortos 
– Szalai 2015). Nevertheless, the austerity measures resulted in economic down-
turn again in many euro area countries and in the United Kingdom, while the 
United States, realising the risks of restraining the stimulation, avoided the recur-
rence of the economic downswing (Figure 3). In the euro area, adequate crisis 
management was hindered by the institutional setup as well as the incompletion 
of the monetary and banking union. In addition, the recapitalisation of banks was 
also delayed, thus protracting bank deleveraging. Although the United Kingdom 
faced a milder economic downturn than the euro area, tightening policy in the 
euro area may have contributed to the result of the Brexit referendum.
Tightening policies not only entail significant welfare costs through the supply 
side channels, but they have an unfavourable impact on demand and thus on the 
labour market as well. Therefore, countries that have fiscal leeway should not 
concentrate on reducing their debt or on austerity measures (Ostry et al. 2016). 
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Another unfavourable side effect of a tight fiscal policy is that it adds to income 
disparities resulting in a lower growth path.
In the current crisis environment, labour market reforms – which improve 
the competitiveness of the economy under normal economic conditions – may 
also entail undesirable negative effects. In the past decades, great emphasis was 
placed on making the labour market more flexible in the United Kingdom. How-
ever, it often resulted in the dismissal of employees or the spread of part-time 
employment. For example, there was a significant increase in the number of zero-
hour employment contracts, which means that although the employer establishes 
permanent employment with the employee, the employer is not obliged to pro-
vide minimum working hours for the employee. All this significantly reduces the 
employees’ social and economic safety. In the scholarly literature one can find 
opinions according to which the flexibility of labour market may also have unfa-
vourable effect under certain conditions. In his study, Eggertsson calls attention 
to the fact that under certain conditions (zero nominal interest rate, deflationary 
pressure in the economy, and decline in output), aggregate employment may de-
cline in spite of increasing labour supply (Eggertsson 2010). In addition, in an un-
favourable demand environment, the greater flexibility of the labour market and 
wages may restrain economic output (Eggertsson – Krugman 2012; Eggertsson 
– Mehrotra 2014).
According to the latest consensus among leading economists about the reasons 
that triggered the euro area crisis, the growth and labour market prospects of 
Figure 3. Developments in economic output in the USA, the euro area, and the UK
Source: OECD.
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the euro area continue to be extremely unfavourable and are expected to remain 
like that for years (Baldwin et al. 2015). Protracted economic problems, in turn, 
contribute to the strengthening of political groups that often hold extreme views, 
which may entail further unfavourable consequences. The authors underline that 
several European banks continue to struggle with problems due to the high por-
tion of non-performing loans and other factors. Examining the reasons for the 
crisis, they call attention to the fact that basically it was not the high debts, but the 
high capital flows within the euro area and the resulting imbalances that caused 
the main problem, which was exacerbated by the fact that due to the single cur-
rency, individual economies were unable to become competitive through the de-
preciation of the exchange rate. In addition, institutional deficiencies of the euro 
area also made the situation worse.
Protracted, inadequately treated economic problems sooner or later entail so-
cial and political consequences as well. This is what has happened during the 
current crisis as well. Bell – Machin (2016) examined the correlation between the 
ratio of those who voted for leaving the European Union and their income posi-
tion. According to their assumption, the income disparities observed in the United 
Kingdom may have considerably contributed to Brexit. Significantly higher por-
tions of voters voted for the exit at the referendum on June 23, 2016, in the lower-
income regions. The arguments in Coyle’s article are similar. In his opinion too, 
mainly the income disparities and the hopeless economic situations of those liv-
ing in certain regions can be connected with the exit outcome of the referendum 
(Coyle 2016). In addition, the author considers the increasing income disparities 
across regions as one of the unfavourable consequences of globalisation.
4. WHAT CAN GREAT BRITAIN AND EUROPE EXPECT?
On the whole, until the closing of the exit negotiations and the obtaining of the 
details, an increase in the uncertainty surrounding economic decisions is ex-
pected. Especially in the case of Britain, it may result in the postponement and 
reconsideration of investment decisions. The resulting negative impacts on the 
real economy may be attenuated by improving export competitiveness stemming 
from a permanent depreciation of the exchange rate of the pound sterling. As 
far as external trade is concerned, both the EU and UK are expected to strive to 
maintain close relations.
Monetary policy conditions in both Britain and Europe may shift in the di-
rection of maintaining permanently loose monetary conditions or further easing 
if necessary. The latest growth projections indicate a major deceleration for the 
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British economy, which may even mean that technical recession may evolve in 
some quarters (Figure 4).
In our opinion, however, the situation is not that clear. The structural problems 
characterizing the EU and, within that, of the euro area as well as the inflexibil-
ity of the institutional system substantially increased the system’s exposure to 
confidence shocks. Accordingly, the longer-term impacts of Brexit as well as its 
social and political consequences affecting other countries will greatly depend 
on whether or not the institutional setup of the EU is able to efficiently manage 
the existing problems. If not, in the case of the EU it may lead to the evolving of 
negative social, political, and economic feedbacks as well as even longer-lasting 
negative real economy scenarios than currently expected.
5. BREXIT AND THE HUNGARIAN ECONOMY
The exit of Britain from the European Union is a socio-economic event of large 
volume, and its real economic impact assessment is a rather complex task.1 The 
reason is that the decision made in the referendum is of binary nature: in or out. 
1  A number of attempts have been made to quantify the impact of Brexit e.g. Pain – Young 
(2004); Baker et al. (2016).
Figure 4. Growth forecasts before and after the Brexit referendum in the UK and in the euro area
Source: Consensus Economics Forecasts on G7 and Western European Countries.
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In the course of changing the regime, the conditions of the exit and the extent of 
the change that will take place in the structure of the economy are surrounded by 
significant uncertainty, partly because we have not seen such an event before. The 
other reason is that Britain’s status after Brexit is still uncertain, which makes it 
difficult for impact assessments to quantify the results of the outcome of the ref-
erendum.2 If no consensus is reached during the negotiations, the impact of Brexit 
may affect the economy and the financial intermediary system of the continent 
too, seriously hindering the growth of the remaining part of the European Union. 
As to the spillover effects expected in the global economic space, we use the ex-
periences of the latest crisis as a point of reference.
The experiences related to the crisis of 2008–2009 made it clear that in the 
case of a significant economic shock, the situation of the financial system and 
the room for manoeuvre for the countercyclical fiscal policy may influence the 
expected growth path of economies in a stronger and more permanent way than 
the impacts coming through direct channels – from the current commercial and 
financial market relations (Szalai – Csortos 2015). Therefore, in the impact as-
sessment of Brexit, secondary, i.e. indirect channels will also be considered in 
addition to the primary or direct channels (Balatoni – Virág 2016). Secondary 
channels include the lending activity and resilience to stress of the financial sys-
tem as well as the room for manoeuvre for the economic policy, and these factors 
may amplify or offset the direct impacts coming from our external markets.
As opposed to the European situation, the vulnerability of Hungary has de-
creased considerably since the crisis of 2008–2009 (Matolcsy 2015). The econo-
my went through a successful stabilisation period. The vulnerability of the coun-
try has been reduced, the fiscal balance has steadily improved, and the balance of 
payments shows a solid surplus. A growth of more balanced structure has started. 
The stability of the banking system has improved.
Now we describe the channels through which Brexit affects Hungarian mac-
roeconomic processes, and considering the strength of individual impulses, we 
outline the impacts expected on Hungarian economy. For the full definition of the 
impacts, we distinguish between primary and secondary impacts (Figure 5). As 
a primary impact, foreign trade may slow down, the funds and money transfers 
coming from the EU may decrease on a longer term, and the possible deteriora-
tion of global willingness to take risks may trigger an increase in risk spread in 
emerging markets. Declining global commodity prices may cause an improve-
ment in terms of trade. Also, on the medium term, working capital may start 
2  Advocates of the exit did not outline their ideas about the new situation, and it is unlikely that 
the EU would accept the British position that has been formulated since the referendum, i.e. a 
free-trade area with restricted movement of labour.
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to flow to the continent and to the Central and Eastern European region. In an 
extreme case, Brexit may result in feedbacks in EU and emerging countries that 
still have vulnerable financial systems. The vulnerability of the Hungarian finan-
cial system has been significantly reduced in the previous years, which limits 
the negative spillover effects. Another important point is that Brexit may trigger 
an economic policy reaction too, under which decision-makers may use active 
demand management tools to mitigate possible negative impacts. The extent of 
this reaction greatly depends on the size of the room for manoeuvre of individual 
countries and governments in the budget.
As for foreign trade, it is worth noting that Hungary’s direct trade exposure 
to the British economy can be considered relatively low, as its share within the 
export of goods and services is less than 5% (Table 2). This ratio is slightly lower 
than the ratio of Russia and Ukraine together before the deepening of the Rus-
sian–Ukrainian crisis. The experiences of that time indicate that as long as an 
external market problem remains local, exporters are able to flexibly adjust to the 
modified situation. However, if the spillover effects of the slowdown in Britain 
generally deteriorated the growth of the euro zone and mainly the outlooks of 
German exporting companies, it would have a negative impact also on the ex-
port outlook of the Central and Eastern European region. In this case, we have 
to consider indirect exposure too, as we have significant direct trade relations 
with the rest of the European Union (share of 75.2%), and they may be affected 
by the transformation of trade relations with Britain. The impact of the general 
slowdown of our external demand on growth may be more significant, as exports 
Figure 5. Channels determining the macroeconomic effects of Brexit on Hungary
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represent a high ratio (92.1%) within domestic GDP. However, this impact is 
mitigated by the high import contents of Hungarian exports (65%).
The second channel, called terms of trade, is partly related to foreign trade, as, 
in parallel with the slower external demand, the demand of developed economies 
for raw materials goes down, and this may improve our terms of trade through 
the drop in prices. As a result of the improved terms of trade, our balance of pay-
ments will nominally improve, while on the other hand, our net exports will be 
adjusted also in volumes to the relative price change already on the short term, 
until the end of 2018, mitigating the unfavourable growth impact of the foreign 
trade channel.
With the exit of Britain, it is reasonable to ask how the lack of funds that are 
not contributed by the UK will affect the total funds of the EU as well as their 
structure, as the UK is a significant net contributor to the budget of the European 
Union (Table 3). This question is especially relevant in the case of the Central and 
Eastern European countries, as high amounts of structural and cohesion funds are 
forwarded to this region.
A number of analyses draw attention to the point that the inflow of EU funds 
to our region may drop already in the short term, deteriorating next year’s growth 
too (Citibank 2016; Morgan Stanley 2016). However, according to our assess-
ment, the change will not affect the present budgetary period of 2014–2020, or 
to a small extent only. Until the closing of the negotiations – regulated in Article 
50 on withdrawal from the EU in the Lisbon Treaty – we expect the status quo to 
remain, i.e. Britain will probably continue paying its net 6% contribution to the 
EU budget until the end of 2018. Following that, the basic question is what kind 
Table 2. Shares related to the foreign demand, %
Hungarian exports of goods and services (2014)
United Kingdom 4.8
EU (without UK) 75.2
Exports (% of GDP, 2015) 92.1
Import share of exports (SUT 2008) 65.0
Source: Hungarian Statistical Office, UNCTAD database.
Table 3. Britain’s contribution to the 2007–2013 budget of the EU
EU budget (bn €) 114.6
Britain’s contribution (bn €) 13.6
Britain’s expenditure (bn €) 6.7
Britain’s net contribution (bn €) 6.9
Proportion of EU budget (%) 6.0
Source: Eurostat.
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of integration will be maintained. It is the common economic interest of the UK 
and the EU to maintain an economic co-operation that is as close as possible, and 
to avoid the re-establishment of customs duties. However, if we calculate with 
an extreme scenario – for instance, in the lack of an agreement – in which the 
funds to be paid by Britain will be fully missing from the EU budget from 2019, 
there are still multiple possible economic outcomes. On the one hand, the missing 
amount may be added by the remaining member states, and on the other hand, 
withdrawals may also be reduced in the ratio of payments.3 Obviously, direct real 
economic impacts need to be expected in the latter case only, when the miss-
ing funds would hinder both public and private investments. Even in an extreme 
case, the impact would not reach 0.2% of the GDP.4 It is important to emphasise, 
though, that in the generally low interest rate environment, the missing funds 
may be compensated better than ever by the affected member states, including 
Hungary, by promoting lending, and by utilising the existing fiscal room for ma-
noeuvre. All in all, the impact of reduced EU funds on growth is practically zero 
in the short term, and it may be negligible in the medium term too, as a result of 
the existing room for manoeuvre available to the economic policy.
In the past few years, the amount of remittances sent home by Hungarian 
citizens working abroad has increased significantly. Some of the wage incomes 
they earn increases the demand in the Hungarian economy, as family members at 
home also receive an income from the transfers. According to the latest research 
(Meyer – Shera 2016), there is a significant and positive relation between re-
mittances and economic growth. According to the balance of payment statistics, 
the total amount of remittances of people working in Great Britain is less than 
half a billion euros. Non-residents working in the UK actually transferred EUR 
0.17 billion to Hungary in 2015, and the income of residents was EUR 0.2 billion 
(but this includes the costs of living there, too, and the actual transfer may be a 
fraction of that). The value of remittances in HUF – and their impact on domestic 
demand – is determined in the short term by the extent and the length of the weak-
3  In the latter case, we may suppose that the EU budget will not be curtailed with across-the-
board cuts, and only the structural and cohesion funds will be reduced, while the expenditures 
on natural resources (e.g. agricultural aids) that make up nearly half of the EU budget, will be 
left intact. This would probably be defended by bigger nations too, therefore its value and base 
are more stable. Consequently, in the worst case, the funds we receive may drop by 12% per 
year after 2018.
4  Based on the 2014–2020 EU budget, the amount missing from EU funds may be slightly more 
than HUF 150 billion per year on average in 2019–2020, which is less than 0.4% of the GDP. 
Some of that is directed to the financing of private investments of high import contents (78%), 
the other part is directed to public investments of lower import contents (28%), as the Gov-
ernment is committed to spending 60% of the funds on economic development. Even in this 
extreme case, the impact of reduced EU funds on growth would not reach 0.2% of the GDP.
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ening of the pound, and in the medium term, by the new regulations regarding the 
movement of labour as defined in negotiations. Based on the views of experts, 
the EU may define the free movement of labour as a condition of maintaining 
closer economic relations (Dhingra – Sampson 2016; Portes 2016). In our view, 
this latter is in the interest of Great Britain too, so we do not expect stricter em-
ployment conditions or possible restrictions for employees working in the British 
economy. Even if a significant portion of the purchasing power of the amounts 
sent home is lost because of a possible very strong (10–20%) depreciation of the 
British currency, the impact at the macroeconomic level would not even reach 
0.1% of the GDP.
The fifth direct channel is the change in risk premium. Following the economic 
crisis in 2008, risk premium increased significantly in a number of countries, 
and received great attention among a wide range of investors. Hungary was no 
exception either, and the strong reliance on external funds – high FX debts both 
of the household sector and the Hungarian state – and the structural growth prob-
lems partly related to this resulted in the significantly worse risk perception of 
Hungary. The fiscal and monetary policy measures of recent years stabilised the 
external and internal balance, and significantly reduced vulnerability, and thus re-
sulted in a fundamental change in the evaluation of the country. In 2013, Hungary 
was released from the excessive deficit procedure, and following the decision 
made by S&P in September 2016, the country was upgraded to the investment 
grade by two credit rating agencies. After the British referendum, money market 
volatility increased in general, and the CDS spread of several countries grew 
significantly. This temporary effect, however, was quickly corrected in the case 
of Hungary: the CDS spread and the government bond yields dropped below the 
level before the referendum, and the forint appreciated against the euro. With its 
reduced vulnerability, the Hungarian economy enjoys the trust of investors, so 
we do not expect a substantial increase in risk premium because of Brexit. This is 
confirmed by the movements of indicators measuring vulnerability too. Among 
emerging economies, Hungary has showed the biggest improvement from 2008 
to 2015 (Figure 6).
The last direct channel is the FDI channel. Multinational companies take sev-
eral considerations into account in their investment decisions such as the quali-
fications of the workforce, the status of the infrastructure, the costs of produc-
tion (wages, taxation environment), and macroeconomic uncertainty. Following 
the British referendum, many questions remained unanswered, but the uncertain 
environment is not favourable for the assessment of the UK by investors in the 
longer term. Recently, Japanese managers warned London that Japanese compa-
nies may transfer their head offices, and company groups of German interest in 
the car industry may make similar decisions. This may be supported by automo-
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tive industry analyses, according to which withdrawal from the EU may cause an 
increase in trade and co-ordination costs, and thus a decline in production (Head 
– Mayer 2015; Dhingra et al. 2016). If this scenario is realised, the target of the 
transfer of manufacturing capacities may be the Central and Eastern European 
region. The region’s countries may be selected primarily on the basis of low pro-
duction costs, stable macroeconomic environment, and the positive experiences 
of the co-operation so far, and thus the capacities of the Hungarian economy may 
also increase.
Looking at indirect impacts, the improvement of the resilience of the Hungar-
ian financial system has effectively reduced the possibility of the emergence of 
negative feedbacks. The Hungarian financial system has no direct linkages to 
that of Britain. However, the consequences of Brexit may sharpen the problems 
in the European banking system, which may have an effect on the Hungarian 
subsidiary banks through their European parents. Presently, the Hungarian bank-
ing system relies on foreign funds to a much less extent than before. On the one 
hand, the crisis forced financial institutions to make adjustments on the assets 
side (reduce lending). On the other hand, owing to the government and central 
bank measures made in the past years (final early repayment and conversion of 
FX loans to HUF), the risk presented by the high ratio of FX loans in the house-
hold portfolio practically ceased to exist. As opposed to the situation in 2008, 
Figure 6. Change in MNB vulnerability index from 2008 to 2015
Note: Negative values mark improvement in vulnerability.
Source: Eurostat, MNB.
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Romania, Bulgaria , and Poland now have the highest ratio of a portfolio exposed 
to exchange rate fluctuations (Figure 7).
The liquidity and capital position of the Hungarian financial system is stable. 
Owing to the changes in regulatory requirements, capital requirement is higher 
than before the crisis. The profitability of the sector and the capital accumulation 
ability of banks improved in the past few years.
As the last channel, we review the tools of economic policy, which may mitigate 
macroeconomic impacts with countercyclical measures. Before the evaluation, it 
is important to point out that the Hungarian growth structure was increasingly 
shifted towards internal demand in the last few years. In the case of a slowdown 
on external markets, recessional impacts may be mitigated by a countercyclical 
economic policy, facilitating the utilisation of free capacities in the economy. The 
deficit of the Hungarian state budget is steadily low, it is expected to be 1.4–1.5% 
of the GDP this year, and around 2.1–2.3% next year. According to the forecast 
by the central bank, there is a substantial fiscal room for manoeuvre for the case 
of a possible slowdown on external markets, even without violating the debt and 
deficit rules of the EU.
All in all, we can say that the impact of Brexit on the Hungarian economy is 
likely to be moderate. Within the direct macroeconomic channels, the impact of 
the foreign trade channel may be the strongest if Brexit brings significant nega-
Figure 7. International comparison of change in the proportion of FX loans 
in the household portfolio
Source: Central banks’ data.
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tive impacts at the whole EU level. In this case, the negative impact on the growth 
of Hungarian exports is mitigated by the expected improvement in terms of trade. 
By our calculations, the drop in EU funds and remittances can have only a mod-
erate impact on Hungarian growth. The vulnerability of Hungary has improved 
considerably since the crisis of 2008–2009. In line with that, the potential second-
round impacts of Brexit will remain moderate, and they may be further mitigated 
by the economic policy by utilising the available room for manoeuvre.
REFERENCES
Atkinson, T. – Luttrell, D. – Rosenblum, H. (2013): How Bad Was It? The Costs and Consequences 
of the 2007–09 Financial Crisis. Dallas Fed Staff Papers, No. 20, July.
Baker, J. – Carreras, O. – Kirby, S. – Meaning, J. – Piggott, R. (2016): Modelling Events: The Short-
term Economic Impact of Leaving the EU. Economic Modelling, 58(November): 339–350.
Balatoni, A. – Virág, B. (2016): Brexit: nagyobb alkalmazkodási képesség, fél siker! (Brexit: greater 
adaptability, half the battle!) MNB. https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/balatoni-andras-virag-barna-
bas-brexit-nagyobb-alkalmazkodasi-kepesseg-fel-siker.pdf 
Baldwin, R. et al. (2015): Rebooting the Eurozone: Step 1 – Agreeing a Crisis Narrative. VOX, 
CEPR’s Policy Portal, November.
Bell, B. – Machin, S. (2016): Brexit and Wage Inequality. In: Baldwin, R. (ed.): Brexit Beckons: 
Thinking Ahead by Leading Economists. Chapter 13, VoxEU.org Book, CEPR Press.
Christiano, L. – Eichenbaum, M. – Rebelo, S. (2011): When is the Government Spending Multiplier 
Large? Journal of Political Economy, 119(1): 78–121.
Citibank (2016): Hypotheticals: What Would Brexit Mean for the CEE? Central Europe Economics 
View.
Coyle, D. (2016): Brexit and Globalisation. In: Baldwin, R. (ed.): Brexit Beckons: Thinking Ahead 
by Leading Economists. Chapter 1, VoxEU.org Book, CEPR Press.
Csortos, O. – Szalai, Z. (2015): Diffi culties in the Management of the Global Financial Crisis: Aca-
demic and Economic Policy Lessons. Financial and Economic Review, 14(3): 5–38.
Dhingra, S. – Ottaviano, G. – Sampson, T. – Van Reenen, J. (2016): The Impact of Brexit on Foreign 
Investment in the UK. CEP Brexit Paper.
Dhingra, S. – Sampson, T. (2016): UK–EU Relations after Brexit: What is Best for the UK Econo-
my? In: Baldwin, R. (ed.): Brexit Beckons: Thinking Ahead by Leading Economists. Chapter 2, 
VoxEU.org Book, CEPR Press.
Eggertsson, G. B. (2010): The Paradox of Toil. Staff Report, No. 433, Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York.
Eggertsson, G. B. – Krugman, P. (2012): Debt, Deleveraging, and the Liquidity Trap: A Fisher-
Minsky-Koo Approach. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(3): 1469–1513.
Eggertsson, G. B. – Mehrotra, N. R. (2014): A Model of Secular Stagnation. NBER Working Paper, 
No. 20574.
G20 (2010): The G-20 Toronto Summit Declaration. Canada, June 26–27.
Head, K. – Mayer, T. (2015): Brands in Motion: How Frictions Shape Multinational Production. 
CEPII Working Paper, No. 26.
Koo, R. C. (2008): The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics: Lessons from Japan’s Great Recession. 
Singapore: John Wiley & Sons.
110 BALÁZS H. VÁRADI – TÍMEA VÁRNAI – BARNABÁS VIRÁG
Acta Oeconomica 66 (2016)
Koo, R. C. (2014): Balance Sheet Recession is the Reason for Secular Stagnation. In: Teulings, 
C. – Baldwin, R. (eds): Secular Stagnation: Facts, Causes and Cures. Chapter 11, VoxEU.org 
Book, CEPR Press.
Matolcsy, Gy. (2015): Economic Balance and Growth – Consolidation and Stabilisation in Hun-
gary 2010–2014. Book Series of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, Budapest: Kairosz Könyvkiadó.
Meyer, D. – Shera, A. (2016): The Impact of Remittances on Economic Growth: An Econometric 
Model. EconomiA (Journal of National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, AN-
PEC, Brazil), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econ.2016.06.001 
Milanovic, B. (2012): Global Income Inequality by the Numbers: In History and Now. Policy Re-
search Working Paper, No. 6259, World Bank.
Nystedt, J. (2016): Market Pulse. Brexit: CEE Scenarios and Implications. Morgan Stanley Invest-
emnt Management.
Ostry, J. D. – Loungani, P. – Furceri, D. (2016): Neoliberalism: Oversold? Finance & Development, 
53(2): 38–41. 
Pain, N. – Young, G. (2004): The Macroeconomic Impact of UK Withdrawal from the EU. Eco-
nomic Modelling, 21(3): 387–408.
Portes, J. (2016): Immigration – the Way Forward. In: Baldwin, R. (ed.): Brexit Beckons: Thinking 
Ahead by Leading Economists. Chapter 3, VoxEU.org Book, CEPR Press.
